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Editorial
Investigating safety incidents: more 
epidemiology please
Learning from errors has become the core of policies to
improve safety in health care. For instance, the World Alliance
for Patient Safety lists ‘reporting and learning to improve
patient safety’ as one of six key action areas [1]. Health care
personnel are encouraged to report incidents, errors, and
near-misses. These events are then analysed to uncover the
underlying causes of the incidents and to propose corrective
actions. The analysis is often based on the framework pro-
posed by James Reason and Charles Vincent [2], which
explores in a systematic fashion how factors related to the
patient, the professional, the task or activity, teamwork, medi-
cal devices, procedures, information systems, etc. relate to the
occurrence of an incident.
The causal attribution model
In such investigations, the investigator has a role similar to
that of a clinician who seeks to identify the underlying cause,
or causes, of a patient’s ailment. Does this patient have renal
failure because of diabetes—or has he been exposed to heavy
metals or organic solvents at his workplace? And this patient
who has lung cancer—of course, he is a smoker of cigarettes.
The idea is that possible causes are known, that the clinician is
able to recognize a possible cause with good reliability, and
that a limited number of causes—sometimes just one—is at
the root of the patient’s problem. Let us call this approach the
causal attribution model (Table 1). To each case of the disease
its cause. To each safety incident its set of contributing fac-
tors. This is how clinical medicine has operated for decades,
with good success. The application of this method has also
yielded important insights into safety incidents. A particularly
rich analysis of weaknesses in the health care system that led
to serious incidents can be found in the paper by Ternov and
Axelsson in this issue of the Journal [3].
But all methods have limitations. The obvious limitation of
the causal attribution model is its reliance on expert opinion
during the analysis of an incident. Experts are prone to biases,
and tend to disagree among themselves [4]. Virtually nothing
is known today about the reliability of expert assessments of
root causes of incidents, but evidence from other fields sug-
gests that it cannot be very high.
The epidemiological risk factor model
A viable alternative to the causal attribution model is the epi-
demiological risk factor model (Table 1). This model does not
attempt to assign a cause to any specific event, but seeks to
uncover statistical associations, at the population level, bet-
ween putative risk factors or causes and outcomes of interest.
Male sex, older age, high blood pressure, smoking, and high
cholesterol level are associated with coronary heart disease in
the general population, but we do not know exactly what
caused a heart attack in Mr Smith. This approach is not inher-
ently superior to the causal attribution model—each model
has advantages and drawbacks (Table 1). But the epidemio-
logical model avoids the main weakness of the causal attribu-
tion model: it does not require human judgment of causality
for individual events.
One type of epidemiological study design that is particu-
larly useful for exploring multiple risk factors for a disease is
the case–control study, where people with and without the
disease of interest, drawn from the same population, are
compared in terms of their past exposure to risk factors. This
type of design can be applied not only to people, but also to
‘events’. This has been successfully done for some time in
research on injuries. For instance, McCarroll and Haddon [5]
have conducted more than 40 years ago a case–control study
of alcohol consumption in relation to accidental death
among New York City automobile drivers. Cases were driv-
ers who were fatally injured in traffic accidents. For each
case, six control drivers were identified from the location of
the crash, on the same day of the week, and the same time of
day, by stopping randomly selected cars. This study demon-
strated a 20-fold increase in the risk of a fatal crash for
drivers whose alcohol levels exceeded 1.0%. The innovative
feature of this study was the careful selection of controls,
which afforded an adjustment for exposure to driving and to
traffic conditions, so that results were interpretable despite
the complexity of the system in which traffic collisions
occur.
In the area of patient safety, a more recent but conceptu-
ally similar study was conducted by Gawande et al. [6] to
examine risk factors for retained instruments and sponges
after surgery. Cases were operations where an instrument or
a sponge was left inside the patient’s body, controls were
operations of the same type where this did not happen.
Information was collected on the patient, the surgical team,
and the context. Retained sponges or instruments were more
likely when the operation was an emergency procedure,
when an unexpected change occurred in the procedure, and
if the patient’s body mass index was high. Only the latter is a
traditional patient-related risk factor, the other two are
related to the health care process. All three could be con-
sidered as contributing causes within the Reason–Vincent
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framework. Just as importantly, performing counts of
sponges and instruments did not have a statistically signi-
ficant protective effect. In a traditional root cause analysis
of such incidents, it is likely that the failure to perform such
a count would have been identified as having a key causal
contribution.
The case–control study is not the only epidemiological
study design that deserves consideration for research into the
causation of incidents. Other designs include cross-sectional
studies such as that reported by Lisby et al. in this issue [7],
large database analyses [8], community surveys [9], rand-
omized trials [10], and before–after studies [11].
The way forward
The unsettling question is why so few epidemiological analytic
studies are done today on what is clearly a major public health
issue. One possible explanation is that the field of patient
safety research lacks standardized case definitions and reliable
measurement tools for risk factors. The concepts of incident,
error, adverse event, near-miss, avoidable harm, misadventure,
etc. are not clearly and consensually defined [12,13]. Until we
agree on what constitutes an ‘event’, research on its causes will
be difficult. Similarly, it is far from certain that all investigators
of incidents would agree on definitions of contributing factors,
such as ‘teamwork problems’. The current project led by the
World Health Organization to develop a taxonomy of patient
safety is therefore most welcome, and should greatly facilitate
future research on patient safety [1].
Another problem is the cultural divide between the patient
safety community and the more traditional public health
community. The former leans heavily on the human factors
psychology and organization science, and has not yet embraced
epidemiology as a basic science. Cross-disciplinary collabora-
tion and training in epidemiology of safety experts should help
broaden the methodological toolbox of incident investigations.
Thomas V. Perneger
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Table 1 Comparison of two models for the analysis of patient safety incidents
Causal attribution model Epidemiological risk factor model
.........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Core disciplines Psychology Epidemiology
Organization science Statistics
System analysis Public health
Typical outcome of interest (i) Human error (i) Health problem
(ii) Incident/event (ii) Incident/event
Unit of analysis Single event Population or sample of events
Design of investigation Single case analysis Case–control study
Prospective study
Randomized trial
Assessment of causes Expert investigation Standardized measurement of risk factors
Attribution of causality Expert understanding of the 
chain of events
Statistical association between risk 
factor and outcome




Key advantages Flexibility and insight Generalizability
Sensitivity to context Capacity to examine joint effects of several 
risk factors
Understanding of causal mechanism Quantification of the strength of risk factors
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